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DISCRETIONARY TRADING ACCOUNTS IN COMMODITY FUTURES ARE
NOT SECURITIES ABSENT HORIZONTAL COMMONALITY
Curran n Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216
(6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981)
In the current split of authority over the scope of the federal securi-
ties laws, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Curran v. MerrillLynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. I sided with those courts holding that a
discretionary trading account2 in commodity futures' is not a security.4
Plaintiffs invested in a discretionary5 trading account program that
1. 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981) (certiorari limited to
issue of whether an implied private right of action exists under the Commodity Exchange Act).
2. "Typically, a customer trading in a discretionary commodity account gives the broker
authority to buy and sell at the broker's discretion, without prior consultation with the customer.
Discretionary accounts are more common for commodities where fast trading is required due to
sharp movement in prices .... " 622 F.2d at 221. For a discussion of discretionary trading
accounts, see H. BINas, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 3-47 to 3-48 (1978).
3. "A commodity future is a standardized contract for the purchase and sale of a fixed
quantity of a commodity to be delivered in a specified future month at a price agreed upon when
the contract is entered into." 622 F.2d at 220 (citing A. BROMBERG, SECURrriES LAws § 4.6 at
82,181 (1975)).
4. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines security as follows:
The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, col-
lateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, in-
vestment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or in-
strument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines security in similar terms:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other
mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or
any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not
include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a
maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace,
or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976) (emphasis added). See also Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (1976); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) (1976).
5. Merrill Lynch claimed that the account was in fact non-discretionary, but conceded that
for purposes of the appeal it must be viewed as discretionary. 622 F.2d at 220. Courts are in
general agreement that non-discretionary trading accounts are not securities. See, e.g., SEC v.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 485 (5th Cir. 1974); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Burkholder,
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had certain unique elements. After losing a substantial amount of
money, plaintiffs filed suit under both state and federal securities laws
charging Merrill Lynch with violating the registration requirements of
the Securities Act of 1933,7 and the antifraud provisions of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934,8 SEC rule lOb-5, 9 and the Michigan Uni-
form Securities Act.'0 They claimed that the account program was an
investment contract and qualified as a security under the Securities
Act" and the Securities Exchange Act. 2
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's partial summary judg-
ment' 3 for defendants and held: A discretionary trading account in
commodity futures is not a security absent a pooling of investor's
interests.'
4
The rapid growth' 5 of the commodity futures market has led to a
significant increase in the number of dissatisfied investors seeking re-
dress. 6 Many of these cases state causes of action under the federal
413 F. Supp. 852, 860 (D.D.C. 1976); Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., 353 F. Supp. 669, 671 (C.D.
Cal. 1973); McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (E.D. La. 1972), aq'd, 477
F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973). See L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 491-92 (temp. student ed. 1961).
6. 622 F.2d at 220. Specifically, Merrill Lynch's "Guided Commodities Account Program"
involved three significant elements: (1) the investors could not withdraw from the program for
eighteen months, (2) a single broker would direct the trading for the entire group of accounts, and
(3) the effect on the market of having control over all the accounts in the program would be
greater than if trading was based only on individual accounts. For the significance of these ele-
ments, see notes 78-81 infra and accompanying text.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
10. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.501 (1970).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1976).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l0) (1976).
13. 622 F.2d at 236-37. The court affirmed the partial summary judgment and reversed and
remanded the order staying plaintiffs fraud claims under the Commodity Exchange Act. Subse-
quently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether an implied
private right of action exists under the Commodity Exchange Act. 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981). For a
review of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning on the implied right of action issue, see 22 Wm. & MARY L.
REv. 579 (1981).
14. 622 F.2d at 222. See note 55 infra and accompanying text.
15. Trading volume in commodity futures contracts rose from 32.2 million contracts in 1975
to 42.09 million in 1977. S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 13, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2087, 2101. Since 1977 the volume of trading in commodity futures has
nearly doubled. For fiscal year 1980, 82.7 million futures contracts were traded. COMMODITY
FuTuREs TRADING COMM'N ANN. REP. 88 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CFTC ANN. REP.].
16. In fiscal 1978 the number of reparations complaints docketed by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission totaled 312, compared with 1,401 for fiscal 1980. CFTC ANN. REP. 140
(1978).
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securities laws because the investor protection is broader and violations
are easier to prove' 7 than under the Commodity Exchange Act of 1933,
as amended by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974.1 When seeking a remedy under the securities laws, an investor
injured through a discretionary trading account must show that the ac-
count is an investment contract subject to the securities laws.' 9 The
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976). See, e.g., Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc. 561 F.2d 96, 99
(7th Cir. 1977); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 686 (5th Cir.
1971); Swank Fed. Credit Union v. C.H. Wagner & Co., 405 F. Supp. 385, 387-88 (D. Mass. 1975).
See generally Bromberg, Commodities Law and Securities Law-Overlaps and Preemptions, 1 J.
CoRP. L. 217 (1976).
18. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). If the federal securities laws covered discre-
tionary trading accounts in commodity futures, a prima facie violation of the registration require-
ments would allow the investor to recover the amount of his investment. See generally Bines,
Regulating Discretionary Management: Broker-Dealers as Catalystsfor Reform, 16 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REv. 347, 356 (1975).
19. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Goldman, 593 F.2d 129 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838 (1979); Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978); Moody v.
Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1978); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th
Cir. 1977); Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp.,
497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974);
Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc., v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974); Commercial Iron &
Metal Co. v. Bache & Co., 478 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457
F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Wiggin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 446 F.2d 792
(5th Cir. 1971); Booth v. Peavey Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970); Continental
Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968); Jenny v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,911 (S.D.N.Y.);
Walsh v. Int'l Precious Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867 (D. Utah 1981); Savino v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Christensen Hatch Farms, Inc. v. Peavey Co., 505 F.
Supp. 903 (D. Minm. 1981); Meredith v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., [1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,701 (D.D.C.); Sennett v. Oppenheimer & Co., 502 F. Supp. 939
(N.D. Il. 1980); Gonzalez v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 499 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345 (D. Nev. 1980);
Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields Co., 467 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1979); Hofmayer v.
Dean Witter & Co., 459 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Plunkett v. Francisco, 430 F. Supp. 235
(N.D. Ga. 1977); Jones v. International Inventors Inc. East, 429 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1977);
Consolo v. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 447 (N.D. Ohio 1976);
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Associated Underwriters, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 168 (D. Utah
1975); Ramsey v. Arata, 406 F. Supp. 435 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Swank Fed. Credit Union v. C.H.
Wagner & Co., 405 F. Supp. 385 (D. Mass. 1975); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distribs., 388 F. Supp.
1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Rochkind v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 254 (D. Md. 1975);
Glazer v. National Commodity Research & Statistical Servs., 388 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Ill. 1974),
afd, 547 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1977); Golding v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 385 F.
Supp. 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Stevens v. Woodstock, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. 11. 1974); Mar-
shall v. Lamson Bros., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Arnold v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 61
(M.D. Pa. 1973); Stuckey v. DuPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Was-
nowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), a'dmem., 491 F.2d 752 (3d
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securities laws contain no statutory definition of "investment contract."
Thus, the courts must interpret the term.2 °
In SEC v. W.. Howey Co. ,2 the Supreme Court defined an invest-
ment contract as a transaction in which the person invests in a "com-
mon enterprise" with the expectation that profits will result solely from
the efforts of a broker or promoter. 2 The Court did not elaborate on
the requirement of a "common enterprise;" consequently, sharp differ-
ences of opinion exist as to what the term means.2
The courts have posited two approaches to the Howey commonality
test.24 One approach' is that discretionary trading accounts26 are se-
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994 (1974); Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
341 F. Supp. 764 (D. Minn. 1972); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D.
Minn. 1968); Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Sinva Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 253 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); SEC v. Wickham, 12 F.
Supp. 245 (D. Minn. 1935).
20. SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). "By including an investment contract
within the scope of§ 2(l) of the Securities Act, Congress was using a term the meaning of which
had been crystallized by ... prior judicial interpretation." Id. at 298.
21. Id. at 293.
22. Id. at 298-99. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), and United
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), reaffirmed the definition used in Howey.
The Supreme Court had confronted the issue of defining a security prior to Howey in SEC v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). In that case, the Court reasoned that the scope of
the securities laws was not limited to the "obvious and commonplace":
Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also reached ifit
be proved as a matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under terms or
courses of dealing which established their character in commerce as "investment con-
tracts," or as "any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security."'
Id. at 351.
23. Bonnett, How Common Is a "Common Enterprise"?, 1974 Amz. ST. L.J. 339, 341.
24. California and Hawaii, in decisions under similarly written state securities statutes,
adopted a third approach that rejects the Howey test. The "risk capital" theory focuses on the
person bearing the burden of risk in the investment arrangement. See, e.g., Silver Hills Country
Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961); State v. Hawaii Mkt.
Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P. 2d 105 (1971). For a general overview of the "risk capital"
theory in relation to the recent Supreme Court decision in Unitedfous. Found, Inc. Y. Formnn,
see Deacon & Prendergast, Defining a "Security" After the Forman Decision, 11 PAC. L.J. 213
(1980).
25. Courts using the vertical commonality approach have relied primarily on Joiner and
Howey as precedent. For an overview of state and federal cases defining "investment contract"
prior to the enactment of the Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act, see Long, An Attempt to
Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream ofSecurities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L.REv. 135,
146-59 (1971). See also Note, Discretionary Commodity Accounts as "Securities"- Applying the
Howey Investment Contract Test to a New Investment Medium, 67 GEo. LJ. 269, 283-85 (1978)
(discussion of state court decisions cited in Howey). The state court decisionslelied on in Howey
support the argument that it is not essential for an investment contract to include an actual pool-
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curities if a vertical commonality requirement is met.27 The District
Court for the Southern District of New York in Maheu v. Reynolds &
Co. 28 was the first to apply the vertical commonality approach. The
Maheu court, citing Howey in support of its conclusion, considered the
"vertical" relationship between investor and broker as determinative.2 9
The court held that even without a pooling of funds or common enter-
prise among investors, a joint account qualified as a security.30 In 1973
the Ninth Circuit adopted the vertical commonality approach, defining
a common enterprise as an investment in which the investor depends
on the efforts of the broker for its success.3 The Fifth Circuit subse-
quently adopted this definition in SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. 32
ing of funds. See, eg., State v. Evans, 154 Minn. 95, 191 N.W. 425 (1922); State v. Gopher Tire &
Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920). See generally Note, supra.
26. Courts are in general agreement that a commodity futures contract itself is not a security.
See, ag., Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Commodity Options Int'l,
Inc., 553 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1977); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir.
1974); Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974); Milnarik v. M-
S Commodities, 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F.Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
27. See, ag., Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Continental Commodities
Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); Marshall v. Lamson Bros., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa
1974); Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Maheu v. Reynolds &
Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The vertical commonality approach would allow a rela-
tonship between a single investor and a broker to satisfy the common enterprise requirement
without a showing of pro-rata profit sharing or pooling of funds. See, e.g., Marshall v. Lamson
Bros., 368 F.Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974). See also Bonnett, supra note 23, at 365-66; Note, Discre-
vonar, Trading Accounts as Securities: Howey Revisited, 16 TULSA L.J. 334, 340 (1980). See also
Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Goldman, 593 F.2d 129 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838 (1979); Moody v. Bache & Co., 570
F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1978); Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir.
1974); Commercial Iron & Metal Co. v. Bache & Co., 478 F.2d 39 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 914 (1979); Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,911 (S.D.N.Y.); Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Christensen Hatch Farms, Inc. v. Peavey Co., 505 F. Supp. 903 (D. Minn. 1981) (by implication);
Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F.Supp. 1142 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
28. 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
29. Id. at 426.
30. Id. at 429. Seven months after the decision in Maheu, the court reaffirmed its reasoning
m Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
31. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
821 (1973). Accord, Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968); Berman
v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F.
Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
32. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974). The case involved a pyramid scheme similar to the one
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and SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp. 33 Noting the purposes of
the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act,34 the Koscot court
stated that a literal reading of the Howey test would frustrate these acts'
remedial purposes.35 In Continental Commodities the court stated that
the inquiry should focus on whether the success of the investment is
dependent upon the expertise of the broker.
36
A significant number of courts reject the vertical commonality ap-
proach and require horizontal commonality among investors before
treating a discretionary trading account as a security.37 The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals decided in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities,
Inc. 11 that the discretionary trading account in question was not a se-
curity subject to the registration requirements39 of the Securities Act.40
The court held that the element of commonality required by the Howey
test was absent41 in an account in which the broker traded for commod-
ity futures on margin.42 Although the investment broker in Minarik
dealt with by the Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). See generally Note, Pyramid Schemes.- Dare to be Regu.
lated, 61 GEo. LJ. 1257 (1973).
33. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974) (involving commodities options). See Note, Discretlonary
A4ccounts, 32 U. MIAMI L. Rnv. 401, 408 n. 41 (1977).
34. The legislative history of the securities laws clearly indicates the remedial purposes be-
hind their enactment. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, SECURITIES REGULATION,
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v, Daniel,
439 U.S. 551, 559 (1979); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975); Tcher-
epnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946);
Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 223 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981).
35. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 480 (5th Cir. 1974).
36. SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974).
37. See, eg., Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977); Milnarik v. M-
S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Sennett v. Oppen-
heimer & Co., 502 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. M11. 980); Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields Co., 467
F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1979); Glazer v. National Commodity Research & Statistical Servs., 388
F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. IlL 1974), af'd, 547 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1977); Stevens v. Woodstock, Inc., 372
F. Supp. 654 (N.D. 11. 1974); Arnold v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 61 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Stuckey v.
du Pont Glore Forgan, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd.,of Trade,
352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aj7'dmem, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973).
38. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
40. 457 F.2d at 279.
41. Id. at 276.
42. A margin account is the security industry's method of extending credit to customers.
Under this practice, the customer-investor-purchases a specified amount of stock from the
securities firm by advancing only a portion of the purchase price, while the brokerage firm extends
credit for the balance due on the stock's purchase price. The firm holds the stock as collateral for
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represented a group of investors, each contract between the broker and
the individual investor was independent of any other contract.43 The
Milnarik court insisted that a pooling of funds and a pro rata distribu-
tion of profits among the several investors was necessary to establish a
common enterprise.44
In 1977 the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed Milnarik in Hirk v. Agri-Re-
search Council, Inc. 4' Rejecting the argument that a strict commonal-
ity requirement is inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the
securities laws,' the court stated that even if the broker had treated the
investors' funds "as if commingled," an actual pooling must occur to
satisfy the common enterprise requirement.47 The Hirk court ex-
plained that without actual pooling, the success or failure of each ac-
count was independent of the other accounts, and therefore a common
enterprise did not exist.48
In Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 41 the Sixth
Circuit confronted a discretionary trading account similar to the one
involved in Milnarik. Using the three-part Howey definition of an in-
the loan. See BLACK'S LAW DIcriONARY 871 (5th ed. 1978). The amount of credit that can be
extended by the broker is regulated under section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78g (1976).
43. 457 F.2d at 277. "In essence, this contract creates an agency-for-hire rather than consti-
tuting the sale of a unit of a larger enterprise." Id. (quoting from the district court's opinion, 320
F. Supp. 1149, 1151 (N.D. M11. 1970)).
44. 457 F.2d at 278.
45. 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977).
46. Id. at 100.
47. Id. at 101.
48. Id. "[Plaintiffs] effort to sidestep [the unitary nature of each account] by stressing...
that substantially similar transactions were made in all accounts and that profits or losses ebbed or
flowed uniformly also fails because the necessary pooling remains unshown." Id.
Relying primarily on the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Milnarik, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals also has required horizontal commonality. See Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade,
352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aft'dmem, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973). "As in Mtilnarik,
nothing in the instant complaint suggests the type of common enterprise or pooling of funds for a
common purpose required to convert the discretionary account plaintiffs had.. . into a statutory
security." Id. at 1069. Plaintiffs in Wasnowic claimed, inter alia, that the broker fraudulently
commingled the investors' funds and that this satisfied the common enterprise requirement. Id. at
1070. The court held that a unilateral fraud, in view of what the parties had originally intended,
did not constitute an investment contract subject to the securities acts. Id. at 1070-71.
49. 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981). Although Senior Cir-
cuit Judge Phillips concurred in part and dissented in part, he concurred with the majority in the
issues discussed in this Comment. He dissented on the issue of the existence of an implied private
right of action under the Commodity Exchange Act. See note 13 supra.
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vestment contract,50 the Curran court affirmed the district court's appli-
cation of horizontal commonality as posited by the Seventh Circuit in
Milnarik. The court, expressly rejecting the Fifth Circuit ruling in SEC
v. Continental Commodities Corp.,5 reasoned that a mere showing of
vertical commonality between investor and broker is inconsistent with
the Howey common enterprise requirement.52 The court agreed with
the conclusion reached by the Southern District of Ohio53 that without
a finding of horizontal commonality the common enterprise require-
ment of Howey is "effectively excise[d]."54 The Curran court insisted
that in addition to vertical commonality, a relationship must exist be-
tween the investors themselves such that each investment is tied to the
success of the group enterprise."5
The court recognized a significant distinction between the factual al-
legations in Milnarik and those in Curran. Plaintiffs in Curran claimed
that Merrill Lynch fraudulently promised to place their investments in
a common enterprise with other accounts in the program.16 They ar-
gued that the unfulfilled promise was sufficient to bring this account
within the definition of a security.57 The court rejected the argument
because each customer knew from the outset that their individual re-
turn would depend only on a "one-to-one" vertical relationship with
50. Id. at 221. "It is universally recognized that the Howey test is comprised of three basic
elements: (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, with (3) profits to come solely
from the efforts of others." Id. Some commentators have preferred to use a four-part test requir-
ing the following: (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with the expecta-
tion of profits, (4) solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. See, e.g., 3 H.
BLOOMENTHAL, SECURrriEs AN FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW § 2.04, at 2-14 (1974); Bonnett,
supra note 23, at 341; Coffey, The Economic Realities ofa "Securlty"' Is there a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 367, 373 (1967); Long, supra note 25, at 142.
51. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974). See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
52. 622 F.2d at 224.
53. Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
54. Id. at 319. Cf. Bonnett, supra note 23, at 365-66 (the author approves of the elimination
of the requirement).
55. 622 F.2d at 224. Although the court did not explain precisely the nature of the required
relationship, the implication is that an actual pooling of investors' funds (with a corresponding
pro-rata share of profits) is necessary. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
56. 622 F.2d at 224.
57. Id. The Milnarik court did not make clear whether an allegation of fraudulent broker
conduct would have resulted in a more favorable disposition of the case for plaintiffs. At least one
court, addressing a similar issue, held that the broker's unilateral fraud in handling accounts was
not sufficient for a finding of the required common enterprise. See note 48 supra and accompany-
ing text. Nevertheless, plaintiffs in Curran claimed that the fraudulent promise by the broker to
form a "common enterprise" was sufficient to find an investment contract security.
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the broker rather than on a horizontal relationship between their ac-
count and those of other investors. 8 The court thus required an actual
pooling of investor capital. 9 An unfulfilled promise by the broker6 0 to
pool investor capital did not suffice to qualify the account as an invest-
ment contract in a common enterprise.61
The current split of authority as to whether commodity trading ac-
counts satisfy the Howey test calls for a response from the Supreme
Court62 or clarifying legislation.63  Sound arguments exist for both the
vertical and the horizontal commonality approaches. The vertical com-
monality approach, which emphasizes the need for a resilient standard,
finds indirect support in several Supreme Court decisions.' Further-
more, the remedial purposes underlying the federal securities laws and
the need for greater investor protection 65 are persuasive reasons to ap-
ply a flexible standard.
The horizontal commonality approach, on the other hand, adheres
58. 622 F.2d at 225.
59. See note 55 supra.
60. The deposition of a customer account executive at Merrill Lynch stated that although
plaintiff's account may have been handled independently of other accounts in the program, the
description of the program given to plaintiffs was such that an expectation of a common enterprise
on their part was understandable. 622 F.2d at 225.
61. Id.
62. Two commentators contend that the present uncertainty among the courts could "open
the door to a system of securities regulation based on judicial pick-and-choose.' Tew & Freed-
man, In Support of SEC v. WJ. Howey Co.: A CriticalAnalysis of the Parameters ofthe Economic
Relationship Between an Issuer of Securities and the Securities Purchaser, 27 U. MnAMI L. REV. 407,
447 (1973). See also Note, supra note 27, at 346. But see Deacon & Prendergast, supra note 24, at
232 (arguing that the Forman decision, in conjunction with Howey, provides a sufficiently clear
framework for the courts).
63. Compare letter from William T. Bagley, Chairman, CFTC, to Senator Herman E. Tal-
madge (May 1, 1978) with letter from James T. McIntyre, Jr., Director, Office of Management and
Budget, to Senator Herman E. Talmadge (April 18, 1978), S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
405, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2087, 2129-34. See generally Bines, supra
note 18, at 390; Note, supra note 33, at 414.
64. See, eg., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979) ("[The] test
is to be applied in light of the '... economic realities of the transaction...' "); United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) ("Congress intended the application of [the
Securities Acts] to turn on the economic realities underlying the transaction"); Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) ("form should be disregarded for substance"); SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943) ("the reach of the [Securities] Act does not stop
with the obvious and commonplace").
65. See generally Hudson, Customer Protection in the Commodity Futures Market, 58 B.U. L.
REv. 1 (1978) (protection offered under the CFTC). See also Bromberg, supra note 17; Note,
supra note 33.
Washington University Open Scholarship
684 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:675
more closely to the test enunciated in Howey.66 The requirement of an
actual pooling of funds and pro-rata profit-sharing provides a clear cut
rule for determining the existence of a security.67 In addition, courts
adopting horizontal commonality68 have noted correctly the increasing
scope of protection offered by the Commodity Exchange Act and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act.69
Commentators have suggested, however, that a close reading of the
Howey opinion reveals faults inherent in both standards. 0 The flex-
ibility of the vertical approach depends on a de-emphasis, if not actual
elimination, of the common enterprise requirement.7' The restrictive
requirement of horizontal commonality fails to provide needed protec-
tion for investors in a rapidly expanding and increasingly complicated
market.72 The pyramid scheme cases confronted by the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits73 illustrate the susceptibility of unsophisticated investors
to imaginative and potentially disastrous investment schemes.74
Until the Supreme Court clarifies its position or Congress enacts ap-
66. See, e.g., Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977); Milnarik v. M-
S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972). See also Bines,
supra note 18 (author contended that logic underlying vertical commonality is strained). But see
Bromberg, supra note 17, at 225-26; Note, supra note 33, at 411-14.
67. See Tew & Freedman, supra note 62, at 448. "Howey has certain superior qualities, one
of which is certainty." Id.
68. See cases cited at note 37 supra.
69. See, e.g., Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 103 n.8 (7th Cir. 1977). Cf.
Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132, 133 (8th Cir. 1970) (the court adopted the
vertical commonality approach but recognized that a private right of action exists for violation of
§ 6d of the Commodity Exchange Act). See also Note, supra note 25, at 272 n.24.70. See, ag, Bonnett, sqpra note 23, at 366. Referring to the horizontal commonality ap-
proach, the author stated that "[piroviding a simple checklist of elements that make up an invest-
ment contract is counterproductive." Id. But see Note, supra note 27, at 340-41. "[One] problem
with [the vertical commonality] approach is that such an interpretation [of Howey] presupposes
the idea that the common enterprise element of the test is mere surplusage and need not be treated
as a distinct element." Id.
71. See Bonnett, supra note 23, at 366.
[I]t seems sufficient to recommend that courts confronted with common enterprise argu-
ments should avoid a dogmatic four-part checklist approach to the necessary factual
analysis. If the other parts of the Howey test are present, the lack ofa "common enter-
prise" should rarely de/eat the finding ofan investment contract.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the author favorably viewed the virtual elimination of the common
enterprise requirement of Howey.
72. See, eg., Bromberg, supra note 17.
73. See note 32 supra.
74. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner




propriate legislation, courts must pay particular attention to the factual
elements peculiar to each case.75 Failure to account for subtle but sig-
nificant differences in the various investment agreements may result in
an excessively rigid application of the Howey test.76 The Howey court
recognized and warned against the potential results associated with
failing to appreciate the remedial nature of the securities laws.77 The
uncertainty in the courts is the necessary result of inadequate defini-
tions in both Howey and the securities acts.
The Sixth Circuit's strict application of Milnarik is misplaced. The
Curran plaintiffs, unlike those in Milnarik, alleged that Merrill Lynch
promised to place their investments in a common enterprise.78 Because
plaintiffs were unable to withdraw their investments for a specified pe-
riod of time, an ostensible, if not actual, pooling of funds occurred.
Merrill Lynch's plan for using this arrangement was to allow the bro-
ker's trading to have a greater effect on the market than if each account
was fully independent. To a certain extent, therefore, the fortunes of
the investors were tied to each other,79 for the greater the effect on the
market, the greater the possibility for success (or failure) of the group
as a whole. The court, however, failed to adequately address this is-
sue"0 by insisting on an actual pooling of investor capital.81 A less rigid
approach would recognize that if the inducements offered for investing
in such an arrangement are fraudulent, then the remedies afforded
under the securities acts are more appropriate than those under the
amended Commodity Exchange Act.
The Curran opinion fails to provide an analysis of important aspects
75. See, eg., Long, supra note 25, at 139.
76. See, eg., notes 78-81 infra and accompanying text.
77. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). "The statutory policy of affording broad
protection to investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic or irrelevant formulae:' Id. at 301. See
also Long, supra note 25, at 139-46.
[I]n spite of the admonishments of the early courts and even the Supreme Court itself
against the crystallization of irrelevant formulas, the courts have created a fixed and
arbitrary definition of investment contract which they are showing great reluctance to
abandon in the face of increased evidence of the need for public protection which an
expanded definition could afford.
Id. at 139-40 (footnotes omitted).
78. 622 F.2d at 224.
79. Id. See Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). "The joint
account may constitute a security even if there was no pooling arrangement or common enterprise
among investors." Id.
80. See Note, supra note 33, at 411 n.53.
81. 622 F.2d at 222-24.
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of the current debate over whether a discretionary trading account in
commodity futures qualifies as a security. Curran merely adds to the
conflict among the courts on this important issue.
R.E.T
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